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Email: jev32@cam.ac.uk This article introduces the conceptual foundations of the initiative towards the
adoption of a Global Pact for the Environment. It first situates the search for a
global framework instrument on environmental protection in a long‐term perspective
and then discusses the main reasons why it is needed. Against this background, the
article presents the current expression of this much broader trend, in the form of
the initiative for a Global Pact for the Environment and the momentum it has gener-
ated in policy circles, first and foremost at the level of the United Nations General
Assembly.
1 | INTRODUCTION
The adoption, on 10 May 2018, of United Nations (UN) General
Assembly Resolution A/72/L.51, entitled ‘Towards a Global Pact for
the Environment’ (Enabling Resolution),1 has justifiably attracted great
public attention, including expressions of support and, inevitably, also
criticism. The resolution called for the establishment of an Ad Hoc
Open‐ended Working Group, which met in early September 2018 in
New York and is scheduled to meet three more times in Nairobi in the
first half of 20192 to discuss the substantive aspects of the initiative
for a Global Pact for the Environment (GPE). Much could be said
about this initiative, in which the authors of this article are closely
involved, and which has received ample coverage in the media3 as
well as in academic and policy circles.4 In the specific context of this
article,5 however, we will limit ourselves to two basic observations,
which will provide the necessary background for the analysis of the
intellectual origins and conceptual foundations underlying the GPE.
The first observation is that it would be a mistake to see the
Enabling Resolution or even the initiative for a GPE as a mere
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1UNGA ‘Towards a Global Pact for the Environment’ UN Doc A/RES/72/277 (10 May 2018)
(‘Enabling Resolution’).
2‘Report of the Ad Hoc Open‐ended Working Group Established Pursuant to General
Assembly Resolution 72/277 of 10 May 2018 Entitled “Towards a Global Pact for the Envir-
onment”’ UN Doc A/AC.289/L.1 (20 August 2018).
3See, e.g., ‘Bid for Environmental Rights Pact to Kick Off in Paris Tomorrow’ (The Times of
India, 23 June 2017); ‘Un Pacte Mondial pour Protéger l'Environnement’ (Le Monde, 25
June 2017); ‘Un Projet de Pacte Mondial pour l'Environnement’ (Le Figaro, 24 June 2017);
‘Macron Promet de Défendre un “Pacte Mondial pour l'Environnement”’ (Reuters, 24 June
2017); ‘Wang Yi Attends Global Pact for the Environment Summit’ (Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 20 September 2017); H Xiao, ‘China Lauds UN
Environment Pact’ (China Daily, 20 September 2017); ‘Macron rilancia all'Onu un Patto
globale per il clima’ (La Stampa, 21 September 2017); ‘Secretário‐geral da ONU pede apoio
a pacto ambiental proposto pela França’ (Naçoes Unidas no Brasil, 22 September 2017); L
Fabius and Y Aguila, ‘Un Pacto Medioambiental’ (El País, 2 August 2018); ‘Global Pact Will
Boost International Environmental Governance’ (The Guardian (Nigeria), 25 September
2018); ‘Appel de 100 Juristes pour l'Adoption d'un Pacte Mondial pour l'Environnement’ (Le
Monde, 9 October 2018); Y Aguila et al, ‘The Time is Now for a Global Pact for the Envir-
onment’ (The Guardian, 9 October 2018); ‘Uhuru: Kenya Committed to Fight against Cli-
mate Change’ (Daily Nation (Kenya), 11 November 2018).
4See, e.g., ‘Global Perspectives on a Global Pact for the Environment’, Sabin Center for Cli-
mate Change Law (Columbia University, 20 September 2018) <http://blogs.law.columbia.ed
u/climatechange/2018/09/20/global-perspectives-on-a-global-pact-for-the-environment/>.
In addition, many meetings have been held around the world, including in Paris (Conference
‘Towards a Global Pact for the Environment’, La Sorbonne, 24 June 2017), New York (Con-
ference on the Global Pact for the Environment, Columbia University, 20 September 2017),
Bogotá (Symposium on the Global Pact for the Environment organized by the Attorney
General of the Nation, 1 March 2018), Brasilia (Round Table on the Global Pact for the
Environment, World Water Forum, 19 March 2018), Dakar (Conference ‘L'Afrique s'engage
pour la Planète’, 14 May 2018), Geneva (Conference on the Global Pact for the Environ-
ment at the UN International Law Commission, 10 July 2018), Santiago de Chile (Coloquio
‘Pacto mundial del medio ambiente, derechos humanos, y constitución’, 28 August 2018),
Québec (Conférence ‘Une opportunité pour un Canada plus vert? Le projet de Pacte mon-
dial pour l'environnement’, 21 September 2018), Ottawa (‘Le projet onusien de Pacte mon-
dial pour l'environnement: quelles implications pour le Canada?’, 24 September 2018),
Beijing (Conference on the Legal Aspects of a Healthy Environment, 12 October 2018),
Naples (‘Une patto globale per l'ambiente’, 19 October 2018).
5This article is part of a wider research project that brings together the knowledge and
expertise of several generations of international environmental lawyers from around the
world to contribute to the development of a Global Pact for the Environment (see Y Aguila
and JE Viñuales (eds), A Global Pact for the Environment: Legal Foundations (Cambridge
C‐EENRG, Advance version, 14 January 2019). The authors wish to acknowledge the partic-
ipation in this research project, the results of which will be published in the form of an edi-
ted volume, of the following contributors (in alphabetical order): Virginie Barral, Antonio
Benjamin, Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, David Boyd, Edith Brown Weiss, Neil Craik,
Pierre‐Marie Dupuy, Leslie‐Anne Duvic‐Paoli, Jonas Ebbesson, Francesco Francioni, Guil-
laume Futhazar, Shotaro Hamamoto, Marie Jacobsson, Walter Kälin, Yann Kerbrat, Ginevra
Le Moli, Sandrine Maljean‐Dubois, Makane Mbengue, Jane McAdam, Pilar Moraga, Nilufer
Oral, Michel Prieur, Alexander Proelss, Qin Tianbao, Lavanya Rajamani, Nicholas Robinson,
Monserrat Rovalo Otero, Jason Rudall, Christina Voigt and Zhang Meng.
DOI: 10.1111/reel.12277
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current development. Quite to the contrary, these developments are
the reflection of deeper trends that have been operating in the back-
ground for decades. For this reason, our second observation is that a
broad question such as whether the adoption of a GPE is desirable,
with certain contents that will be discussed later, is best answered
not by zooming in to argue about the details – which are, indeed, a
matter for debate – but by zooming out to understand the funda-
mentals.
This is why this article first situates the search for a global frame-
work instrument on environmental protection in a long‐term perspec-
tive and then discusses the main reasons why it is needed. Against
this background, we then present the current expression of this much
broader trend, in the form of the initiative for a GPE and the momen-
tum it has generated in policy circles, first and foremost at the level
of the UN General Assembly. But the need for such an instrument
heavily depends on its nature, content and articulation with existing
international instruments, which must be designed to specifically allow
for significant flexibility in its implementation by States with different
legal systems and political realities. For that reason, we propose an
analytical framework to guide the delicate exercise of striking a bal-
ance between a range of different considerations.
The latter point has been misinterpreted in some circles, some-
times disingenuously so. The heart of the initiative for a GPE is not
the specific formulation of certain principles in the draft project or
even the architecture retained for it. Much more importantly, it is the
widely shared impression that this is an idea whose time has come.
2 | THE GLOBAL PACT IN THE EVOLUTION
OF GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL
GOVERNANCE
The ambition to develop a global pact for the environment is not
new. In situating the current initiative, it is important to clarify what
forms this ambition has taken in the past and how they fitted within
the broader context of global environmental governance.
The first significant attempt to develop a global framework for
environmental protection is certainly the Conference on the Human
Environment held in Stockholm in June 1972.6 This is widely
considered as the constitutional moment of international environ-
mental law,7 as well as a catalyst for domestic environmental law.8
The ‘framework’ provided fell short of a global treaty, but it defined
the province of global environmental governance and set the institu-
tional and strategic foundations for further action on environmental
protection.9 The international context was, however, not entirely
auspicious for such an important development. Indeed, the deep ideo-
logical and policy divides of the Cold War10 and, no less important,
of the quest for ‘permanent’ economic sovereignty by newly inde-
pendent States and other developing countries11 undermined, to
some extent, the representative character of the statements made at
Stockholm.12 Yet, the Stockholm Conference provided a solid basis
on which to build a more structured framework.
During the 1980s, the efforts leading to the adoption of the World
Charter for Nature13 and, following the realization – in the 1982 meet-
ing of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) Governing
Council – of the scope of environmental degradation, the establishment
of the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED),
generated momentum for a second and more structured attempt. Two
key recommendations of the WCED's outcome report, ‘Our Common
Future’, were the adoption of a Universal Declaration as well as of a
6‘Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm 5–16
June 1972’ UN Doc A/CONF.48/14/Rev1 (1973). For contemporary assessments of the out-
comes, see A Kiss and D Sicault, ‘La Conférence des Nations Unies sur l'Environnement
(Stockholm, 5–16 June 1972)’ (1972) 18 Annuaire Français de Droit International 603; LB
Sohn, ‘The Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment’ (1973) 14 Harvard Interna-
tional Law Journal 423. For two contemporary accounts, see W Rowland, The Plot to Save
the World. The Life and Times of the Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment (Clarke,
Irwin & Company 1973); M Strong, ‘One Year after Stockholm: An Ecological Approach to
Management’ (1973) 51 Foreign Affairs 690.
7See, e.g., PM Dupuy and JE Viñuales, International Environmental Law (2nd edn, Cambridge
University Press 2018) 8–12; P Sands et al, Principles of International Environmental Law (4th
edn, Cambridge University Press 2018) 29–32; J Cretella Neto, Curso de Direito Internacional do
Meio Ambiente (Saraiva 2012) 127–141; JJ Ruiz, ‘Orígenes y Evolución del Derecho Interna-
cional del Medio Ambiente’ in F Sindico, R Fernández Egea and S Borràs Petinat (eds), Derecho
Internacional del Medio Ambiente (Cameron May 2011) 3; U Beyerlin and T Marauhn, Interna-
tional Environmental Law (Hart 2011) 7–8; D Hunter, J Salzman and D Zaelke, International
Environmental Law and Policy (4th edn, Foundation Press 2011) 140–145; P Birnie, A Boyle and
C Redgwell, International Law and the Environment (3rd edn, Oxford University Press 2009) 48–
50; L Guruswamy and KL Doran, International Environmental Law (Thomson‐West, 2007) 34–39;
A Kiss and JP Beurier, Droit International de l'Environnement (3rd edn, Pedone 2004) 32–34.
8See, e.g., RL Lutz, ‘The Laws of Environmental Management: A Comparative Study’ (1976)
24 American Journal of Comparative Law 447. For a statement of environmental law before
the Conference, see Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars (ed), The Human
Environment, Vol II: Summary of National Reports Submitted in Preparation of the United
Nations Conference on the Human Environment (1972).
9Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (Stockholm, 16
June 1972) in ‘Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment’ (n 6).
10In early May 1972, the Nixon administration announced the mining of the Haiphong harbour,
in a major escalation of the VietnamWar. Moreover, countries of the then Soviet bloc abstained
from participating in the Stockholm Conference in protest of the exclusion of East Germany.
See EP Morgan, ‘Stockholm: The Clean (But Impossible) Dream’ (1972) 8 Foreign Policy 149.
11A major milestone of this quest was the adoption by the UN General Assembly of Reso-
lution 1803(XVII): UNGA ‘Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources’ UN Doc A/RES/
1803/XVII (14 December 1962). On the legal process leading to this resolution, see NJ Schri-
jver, Sovereignty over Natural Resources: Balancing Rights and Duties (Cambridge University
Press 1997). For the wider historical context explaining the need to assert ‘permanent’ sover-
eignty, see B Simpson, ‘Self‐determination and Decolonization’ in M Thomas and A Thomson
(eds), The Oxford Handbook of the Ends of Empire (Oxford University Press 2017) 417.
12The tension between development and environmental protection as potentially conflicting
goals found expression, among others, in the meeting held at Founex, on the outskirts of
Geneva, one year before the Stockholm Conference (‘Development and Environment:
Report and Working Papers of Experts Convened by the Secretary‐General of the United
Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Founex, Switzerland 4–12 June 1972’)
and, subsequently, in December 1971, with the adoption of a resolution by the UN General
Assembly asserting the over‐riding importance of development (UNGA ‘Development and
Environment’ UN Doc A/RES/2849/XXVI (20 December 1971)). On this tension, see K Mick-
elson, ‘The Stockholm Conference and the Creation of the South–North Divide in Interna-
tional Environmental Law and Policy’ in S Alam et al (eds), International Environmental Law
and the Global South (Cambridge University Press 2016) 109.
13UNGA ‘World Charter for Nature’ UN Doc A/RES/37/7 (28 October 1982).
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Convention on Environmental Protection and Sustainable Develop-
ment.14 One of the leading international organizations active in the area
of environmental protection, the International Union for the Conserva-
tion of Nature (IUCN), developed on that basis a Draft International
Covenant on Environment and Development, which it sought to intro-
duce – through the delegation of Iceland – in the process leading to the
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, held in
Rio de Janeiro in June 1992.15 But the attempts to have such an instru-
ment adopted were unsuccessful. Yet, IUCN, through its Environmental
Law Programme, has made efforts to keep this idea alive, revising and
updating the ‘Draft Covenant’ since the 1990s.16
By contrast, the idea to adopt by consensus, and this time by the
full international community, a universal declaration came to fruition
in the form of the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Develop-
ment.17 At the time, some saw the Rio Declaration as a step back-
wards because of the prominent place it gives to development
concerns.18 However, with the benefit of hindsight, the Rio Declar-
ation can be considered as the closest step taken so far to formulate a
set of consensual and balanced constitutional principles for global
environmental governance.19 Its principles, several of which were
newly minted or stated for the first time in an authoritative instrument
with global reach,20 have been subsequently taken up in a range of
global treaties. Three major illustrations of this influence are provided
by the precautionary principle (stated in Principle 15 as an
approach),21 the principle of common but differentiated responsibil-
ities (stated in Principle 7)22 and the principle of public participation in
environmental matters (stated in Principle 10).23 Other principles, par-
ticularly the three norms that constitute the heart of customary inter-
national environmental law,24 namely prevention (stated in Principle
2),25 the requirement to conduct an environmental impact assessment
(stated in Principle 17)26 and the duty of cooperation (stated in Princi-
ples 18 and 19),27 also received their authoritative formulation in the
Rio Declaration. But these examples also illustrate the limitations of a
statement of principles in a ‘soft law’ instrument such as the Rio Decla-
ration. Such limitations highlight the need for a Global Pact.
3 | THE NEED FOR A GLOBAL PACT
The adoption of a GPE would constitute an important milestone in
the evolution of international environmental law and, more generally,
of global environmental governance. There are several reasons for it,
some which are readily apparent and some others which require a
more detailed understanding of international, comparative and
domestic law. The first reason is relatively straightforward. The Rio
Declaration is not binding as such, a feature that has prevented
some principles from deploying their full effects.28
The second reason is the absence of a broader common core of
legally binding principles on which significant gaps in the regulation
could rely upon, which leaves certain important questions too open
or unsettled. Most observers would accept that plastic pollution is
currently a matter that has largely remained unaddressed or has ‘fall-
en between the cracks’ of international instruments. In fact, the
entire land‐based marine pollution regime rests, at the global level,
on some laconic provisions of the UN Convention on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS)29 or on soft law instruments, and the same is true of
14World Commission on Environment and Development, ‘Our Common Future: Report of
the World Commission on Environment and Development’ (10 March 1987) Chapter 12,
Section 5.2, paras 85–86.
15‘Draft Covenant on Environmental Conservation and Sustainable Use of Natural
Resources’ UN Doc A/CONF.151/PC/WG.III/4 (21 August 1991). See JE Viñuales, ‘The Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development: Preliminary Study’ in JE Viñuales (ed), The
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development: A Commentary (Oxford University Press
2015) 1, 10.
16The IUCN, in collaboration with the International Council of Environmental Law, have
pursued work on a ‘Draft Covenant’, which now has several editions. See IUCN, Draft Inter-
national Covenant on Environment and Development (5th edn, IUCN 2017) <https://sustain
abledevelopment.un.org/index.php?page=view&type=400&nr=2443>.
17Rio Declaration on Environment and Development in ‘Report of the United Nations Con-
ference on Environment and Development’ UN Doc A/CONF.151/26 (vol I) (12 August
1992) Annex. See Viñuales, ‘Preliminary Study’ (n 15).
18See, e.g., H Mann, ‘The Rio Declaration’ (1992) 86 American Society of International Law
Proceedings 405, 409; M Pallemaerts, ‘International Environmental Law from Stockholm to
Rio: Back to the Future?’ (1992) 1 Review of European Community and International Envir-
onmental Law 254, 256; DA Wirth, ‘The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development:
Two Steps Forward and One Back, or Vice Versa?’ (1995) 29 Georgia Law Review 599, 648.
19Viñuales, ‘Preliminary Study’ (n 15) 60.
20ibid 15–16, discussing the model proposed by the late Alexandre Kiss, according to whom
no less than seven principles of international environmental law (common but differentiated
responsibilities, precaution, polluter‐pays, environmental impact assessment, notification of
emergencies, notification and consultation in case of risk, peaceful settlement of disputes)
were newly stated in the Rio Declaration. See A Kiss, ‘The Rio Declaration on Environment
and Development’ in L Campiglio (ed), The Environment After Rio: International Law and Eco-
nomics (Graham & Trotman/Martinus Nijhoff 1994) 55.
21See AA Cançado Trindade, ‘Principle 15: Precaution’ in Viñuales, The Rio Declaration (n
15) 403; MM Mbengue, Essai sur une Théorie du Risque en Droit International Public: L'Antici-
pation du Risqué Environnemental et Sanitaire (Pedone 2009); A Trouwborst, Evolution and
Status of the Precautionary Principle in International Law (Kluwer 2002).
22See P Cullet, ‘Principle 7: Common but Differentiated Responsibilities’ in Viñuales, The Rio
Declaration (n 15) 229; L Rajamani, Differential Treatment in International Environmental Law
(Oxford University Press 2006).
23See J Ebbesson, ‘Principle 10: Public Participation’ in Viñuales, The Rio Declaration (n 15)
287; A Epiney et al, Aarhus-Konvention. Handkommentar (Nomos 2018).
24See Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v Nicaragua)
and Construction of a Road in Costa Rica along the San Juan River (Nicaragua v Costa Rica)
(Judgment) [2015] ICJ Rep 665 (‘Costa Rica/Nicaragua’) para 104. On the current state of
customary international law relating to environmental protection, see JE Viñuales, ‘La Pro-
tección Ambiental en el Derecho Internacional Consuetudinario’ (2017) 69 Revista Española
de Derecho Internacional 71; PM Dupuy, ‘Formation of Customary International Law and
General Principles’ in D Bodansky, J Brunnée and E Hey (eds), The Oxford Handbook of
International Environmental Law (Oxford University Press 2007) 449.
25See LA Duvic‐Paoli and JE Viñuales, ‘Principle 2: Prevention’ in Viñuales, The Rio Declar-
ation (n 15) 107; LA Duvic Paoli, The Prevention Principle in International Environmental Law
(Cambridge University Press 2018); X Hanqin, Transboundary Damage in International Law
(Cambridge University Press 2003).
26See N Craik, ‘Principle 17: Environmental Impact Assessment’ in Viñuales, The Rio Declar-
ation (n 15) 451; N Craik, The International Law of Environmental Impact Assessment (Cam-
bridge University Press 2008); NA Robinson, ‘International Trends in Environmental Impact
Assessment’ (1992) 19 Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review 591.
27See L Boisson de Chazournes and K Sangbana, ‘Principle 19: Notification and Consult-
ation on Activities with Transboundary Impact’ in Viñuales, The Rio Declaration (n 15) 492;
P Okowa, ‘Principle 18: Notification and Assistance in Case of Emergency’ in Viñuales, The
Rio Declaration (n 15) 471; F Francioni and H Neuhold, ‘International Cooperation for the
Protection of the Environment: The Procedural Dimension’ in W Lang, H Neuhold and K
Zemanek (eds), Environmental Protection and International Law (Graham & Trotman 1991)
203.
28See, e.g., European Communities – Measures affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech
Products (29 September 2006) WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R, WT/DS293/R (‘EC – Biotech’)
paras 7.88–7.90; India – Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells and Solar Modules (16
September 2016) WT/DS456/AB/R paras 592, 596 and 5.149.
29See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (adopted 10 December 1982,
entered into force 16 November 1994) 1833 UNTS 3 (UNCLOS) arts 207 and 213.
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the critical problem of air pollution, which is only regulated regionally
at the present.30 These are certainly not minor lacunae that can be
addressed by mere ‘tweaks’ of existing instruments. In time, they will
call for an organized binding response. In the meantime, their broad
regulation could rely on a general statement of binding principles.
Third, there are even broader questions that influence the operation
of the entire international environmental law system and that have been
largely overlooked. A major example is consumption‐driven environ-
mental degradation, that is, environmental degradation in one country
led by consumption in others.31 Unfortunately, neither the Rio Declar-
ation32 nor the numerous multilateral environmental agreements
(MEAs) have much to offer in this regard. The large majority of them
(with the notable exception of CITES33) focus on production and, thus,
they offer almost no means to address the situation of a country in
which environmental degradation is driven by foreign consumption.
Fourth, yet another form of gap concerns the possible conflicts
between instruments with limited sectoral or spatial scope. The ocean
may appear, from the perspective of the climate change regime or that
of the ocean dumping regime as a carbon sink or a carbon sequestration
dumpsite,34 but that is in open conflict with the requirements of the
provisions on the protection and preservation of the marine environ-
ment under the UNCLOS35 or in the ongoing negotiations relating to
the protection of biodiversity beyond national jurisdiction.36 Legally,
there are no overarching principles, aside from the limited set of
customary international environmental law norms, that could provide
solutions to such far‐reaching conflicts. Thus, when one considers the
questions of ‘gaps’ seriously, beyond the superficial references to com-
monly acknowledged lacunae, there is a much deeper need for a binding
overarching framework.
A fifth problem, related to the previous one, comes from the fact that
some of the Rio principles have been understood and treated differently
across treaty contexts and their related dispute settlement mechanisms,
with important practical implications. Three examples concern the differ-
ent positions taken with respect to the nature and scope of the precau-
tionary principle/approach,37 those regarding the spatial scope of the
requirement to conduct an environmental impact assessment38 and
those relating to public participation.39 This divergence is possible
because of a lack of an overarching statement of binding principles.
A sixth and important reason is that the guidance provided by the
Rio Declaration to national legislators and courts is neither clear nor
strong enough.40 The example of the precautionary principle/approach
provides, once again, an apposite illustration. One can attempt, in this
regard, to identify uses of this principle and to organize them across a
spectrum that goes from more conservative to more ambitious ones.41
Such references have indeed been used: (i) to caution against the prin-
ciple's ‘potentially paralysing effects’;42 (ii) to assess whether certain meas-
ures expressly adopted on the basis of the precautionary principle are
indeed justified under this principle;43 (iii) as a stand‐alone norm
30See, e.g., Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution (adopted 10 June 2002, entered
into force 25 November 2003) <http://haze.asean.org/?wpfb_dl=32>; Convention on Long
Range Transboundary Air Pollution (adopted 17 November 1979, entered into force 16
March 1983) 1302 UNTS 217. On these instruments, see P Nguitragool, Environmental
Cooperation in South-East Asia: ASEAN's Regime for Transboundary Haze Pollution (Routledge
2011); J Sliggers and W Kakebeeke (eds), Clearing the Air. 25 Years of the Convention on
Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution (United Nations 2004); A Byrne, ‘The 1979 Conven-
tion on Long‐range Transboundary Air Pollution: Assessing its Effectiveness as a Multilateral
Environmental Regime after 35 Years’ (2015) 4 Transnational Environmental Law 37.
31In two cases, China sought to justify restrictions on the exports of certain raw materials
and rare earths on the grounds that foreign demand led to their over‐extraction, which in
turn was a harmful activity for the environment in China. In both cases, China relied on the
general exception in Article XX(g) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, but the
argument was rejected. See China – Measures related to the Exportation of Various Raw
Materials (5 July 2011) WT/DS394/R, WT/DS395/R, WT/DS398/R para 7.586; China –
Measures Relating to the Exportation of Rare Earths, Tungsten, and Molybdenum (7 August
2014) WT/DS431/AB/R, WT/DS432/AB/R, WT/DS433/AB/R paras 5.188–5.194. Other
examples of consumption‐driven environmental degradation abroad include so‐called indi-
rect land‐use change, plastic pollution of the oceans and emissions from production of car-
bon‐intensive goods for export markets. See, e.g., DM Lapola et al, ‘Indirect Land‐use
Changes Can Overcome Carbon Savings from Biofuels in Brazil’ (2010) 107 Proceedings of
the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 3388; JR Jambeck et al,
‘Plastic Waste Inputs from Land into the Ocean’ (2015) 347 Science 768; ‘Global Perspec-
tives on a Global Pact for the Environment’ (n 4) (contribution by A Wang); R Muradian et
al, ‘Embodied Pollution in Trade: Estimating the “Environmental Load Displacement” of
Industrialised Countries’ (2002) 41 Ecological Economics 51; J Kitzes et al, ‘Consumption‐
based Conservation Targeting: Linking Biodiversity Loss to Upstream Demand through a
Global Wildlife Footprint’ (2017) 10 Conservation Letters 531.
32See C Voigt, ‘Principle 8: Sustainable Patterns of Production and Consumption and Demo-
graphic Policies’ in Viñuales, The Rio Declaration (n 15) 245.
33Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora
(adopted 3 March 1973, entered into force 1 July 1975) 992 UNTS 243 (‘CITES’).
34See RE Kim, ‘Is a New Multilateral Environmental Agreement on Ocean Acidification Ne-
cessary?’ (2012) 21 Review of European, Comparative and International Environmental Law
243; Y Downing, ‘Ocean Acidification and Protection under International Law from Nega-
tive Effects: A Burning Issue amongst a Sea of Regimes?’ (2013) 2 Cambridge Journal of
International and Comparative Law 242.
35UNCLOS (n 29) art 192.
36See E Barritt and JE Viñuales, ‘A Conservation Agenda for Biodiversity beyond National
Jurisdiction. Legal Scan’ (UNEP World Conservation and Monitoring Centre 2016) 35–39.
37The divergence is serious with respect to precaution, with different international courts
and tribunals considering that: (i) it is not a recognized norm of customary international law
(EC – Biotech (n 28) para 7.88) or, conversely, (ii) that it is indeed recognized (Tatar v Ro-
mania, App No 67021/01 (ECtHR, 27 January 2009) para 120), with two positions in‐
between, namely (iii) that is an emerging norm (Responsibilities and Obligations of States
Sponsoring Persons and Entities with Respect to Activities in the Area (Advisory Opinion)
[2011] ITLOS Rep 10 (‘Responsibilities in the Area’) para 135) or (iv) that it ‘may be relevant’
for interpretation purposes (Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v Uruguay) (Judgment)
[2010] ICJ Rep 14 (‘Pulp Mills’) para 164). See Dupuy and Viñuales (n 7) 72–73.
38Whereas the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has only recognized the requirement to
conduct an environmental impact assessment in a transboundary context (Pulp Mills (n 37)
para 204; Costa Rica/Nicaragua (n 24) para 104), the Seabed Chamber of the ITLOS and an
arbitral tribunal acting under Annex VII of the UNCLOS have recognized that this require-
ment also applies to activities with a potential impact on the global commons or disputed
areas (Responsibilities in the Area (n 37) para 145; In the Matter of the South China Sea Arbi-
tration before and Arbitral Tribunal Constituted under Annex VII of the United Nations Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea (Republic of the Philippines v People's Republic of China), PCA Case
No 2013‐19, Award (12 July 2016) paras 947–948). See Dupuy and Viñuales (n 7) 79.
39Whereas in the Pulp Mills case, the ICJ seemingly rejected – albeit in ambiguous terms –
the idea that there may be an applicable public participation requirement that must be
taken into account in defining the content of an EIA (Pulp Mills (n 37) para 216), the ECtHR
recognized the need for public participation, as fleshed out in Principle 10 of the Rio
Declaration and the 1998 Aarhus Convention, in a case against Turkey, which is not a party
to the latter (Taskın and Others v Turkey, App No 46117/99 (ECtHR, 10 November 2004)
paras 99–100). See Dupuy and Viñuales (n 7) 88.
40See Y Aguila and S Maljean‐Dubois, ‘Un Pacte Mondial pour l'Environnement, pour Quoi
Faire?’ (The Conversation, 19 June 2017).
41See E Scotford, ‘Environmental Principles across Jurisdictions: Legal Connectors and Cata-
lysts’ in E Lees and JE Viñuales (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Environmental
Law (Oxford University Press 2019 fc); JE Viñuales, The Architecture of Comparative Environ-
mental Law (2019 fc) Chapter 4.
42Canada: Canadian Parks and Wilderness Society v Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage),
2003 FCA 197 (reasoning that, to avoid such paralysing effects, projects that are otherwise
socially and economically useful must be allowed to proceed before their environmental
consequences are known).
43EU: Case T‐257/07, France v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2011:444 (relying on this principle on
a stand‐alone basis, i.e. to conduct an administrative review of a measure which has not
been adopted on precautionary grounds). See Case T‐229/04, Sweden v Commission, ECLI:
EU:T:2007:217.
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relevant to produce procedural effects (the reversal of the burden of
proof);44 (iv) as a stand‐alone norm relevant to the interpretation of an
environmental provision governing a case;45 (v) as a stand‐alone norm
for reviewing of government action;46 (vi) as a stand‐alone norm creat-
ing a positive procedural obligation;47 (vii) as a stand‐alone norm
redefining the parameters of liability (effectively transforming a fault‐
based liability system into a strict liability one);48 and (viii) as a stand‐
alone norm requiring the creation of a new administrative system.49
One possible reason for this variation is that the understanding of this
principle fluctuates significantly across jurisdictions. Legislators and
judges who are aware of the scope of the environmental crisis would
be certainly more empowered in their everyday work if they could rely
on a binding treaty rather than on a soft law instrument. Environmen-
tal protection may face great resistance in some specific periods of the
political life of a country, but international norms are patient. Lack of
reliance on them or even open confrontation do not necessarily jeop-
ardize their operation.
Finally, a binding instrument with an institutional structure, even
a very light one, would be more conducive to the constant interpret-
ation of its principles, either in concreto, for instance in the context
of specific communications, or in abstracto, for example by means of
authoritative interpretations such as the practice of general
comments in human rights committees.
Overall then, although the Rio Declaration has made a lasting
contribution to global environmental governance, its very nature pre-
vents it from addressing the type of problems faced by the current
global environmental governance structure.
4 | THE INITIATIVE FOR A GLOBAL PACT
AND THE UN PROCESS
The previous section briefly presented the broader context of the ini-
tiative for a GPE. The initiative emerged in the run‐up to the Paris
Agreement. The period going from the Rio Summit on Sustainable
Development, held in June 2012,50 to the adoption of the Paris Agree-
ment in December 201551 saw several major developments, most
notably the Addis Ababa Action Agenda on Financing for Develop-
ment in July52 and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development,
with its Sustainable Development Goals, in September 2015.53
In this more specific context, in November 2015, the Commission
Environnement of the Club des juristes, a legal think tank based in Paris,
released a report on how to strengthen the effectiveness of interna-
tional environmental law.54 The report made 21 recommendations,
including the adoption of an International Environmental Pact.55 Fol-
lowing the adoption of the Paris Agreement, Laurent Fabius (President
of the 21st Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Conven-
tion on Climate Change) decided to support the idea and to take it to
the international level. Throughout 2016, a documentary basis was
assembled by the Commission Environnement and, in early 2017, an
international network of environmental law experts was set up.
Today, this network has over 100 experts from more than 40 differ-
ent countries representing all legal systems and a wide variety of
country situations. Under the aegis of the Commission Environnement,
and with support from a smaller group of experts who handled the
drafting, this network made a range of submissions over five rounds
of structured consultations which unfolded in the first half of 2017.
Such consultations addressed matters such as the need (or not) for an
international treaty, its overall structure, its content and, more specific-
ally, the formulation of the principles that would feature in the draft
agreement. The drafting process also benefitted from some previous
efforts, including IUCN's Draft Covenant56 and another draft project57
44Australia (New South Wales): Telstra Corporation Ltd v Hornsby Shire Council [2006]
NSWLEC 133; (2006) 67 NSWLR 256 (relying on the precautionary principle to require the
proponent of a development – the installation of mobile phone antennas – to establish the
absence of risk); Brazil: STJ, Resp n 1330027/SP, 3a turma, decision of 11 June 2012 (civil
liability case where the burden of proving the impact on aquatic fauna caused by the con-
struction of a dam was reversed, requiring the proponent to establish that its project would
not have the alleged impact); Canada: Resurfice Corp v Hanke, 2007 SCC 7; Clements v Cle-
ments, 2012 SCC 32 (where causation rules were relaxed somewhat in a case in which the
defendant negligently had created a risk and scientific uncertainty prevented the plaintiff
from proving causation); India: Vellore Citizens’ Welfare Forum v Union of India AIR, 1996 SC
2715 (where the industry was deemed to bear the burden of proving that its activity
caused no harm); Indonesia: Ministry of Environment v PT. Kalista Alam, Decision of the
Supreme Court No 651 K/PDT/2015 (28 August 2015) (applying precautionary reasoning –
presented as in dubio pro natura – to effect a relaxation of causation requirements).
45Mexico: Case XXVII.3o9 CS., SJFG, 10th Period, Book 37, December 2016, 1840 (relying
on Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration to interpret the right to a healthy environment
enshrined in Article 4 of the Mexican Constitution).
46Canada: Centre Québécois du droit de l'environnement v Canada (Environment), 2015 FC
773 (where government inaction – failure to protect endangered species – violated the duty
to consider the precautionary principle), Wier v Canada (Health), 2011 FC 1322 (where the
government's refusal to review a pesticide despite disagreement among government scien-
tists as to the pesticide's risk violated the duty to consider the precautionary principle); Bra-
zil: TRF 1, Apelação cível n 2001.34.00.010329-1/DF, decision of 12 February 2004
(suspending the operating licence of insecticide plants pending further impact studies); TRF
2, Agravo de instrument n 0004075-70.2012.4.02.0000, decision of 31 July 2012 (suspend-
ing oil exploration activity pending further impact studies); India: Vellore Citizens’ Welfare
Forum v Union of India AIR 1996 SC 2715 (relying on administrative action with respect to
certain tanneries operating in the Indian State of Tamil Nadu); UK: Downs v Secretary of
State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs [2009] Env LR 19 (relying on the precautionary
principle to assess a pesticide approval process).
47Brazil: STJ, Resp 1172553/PR, 1a turma, decision of 27 May 2014 (requiring the conduct
of an environmental impact assessment despite the absence of an express requirement to
do so in the governing law); Canada: Castonguay Blasting Ltd v Ontario (Environment), 2013
SCC 52 (requiring companies to report the release of seemingly benign materials to enable
the government to respond in case of possible environmental harm).
48Indonesia: Dedi et al v PT Perhutani, Decision of the Supreme Court No 1794 K/PDT/
2004 (22 January 2007) (relying on the precautionary principle to determine the strict liabil-
ity in tort law for the damage suffered by the victims of a landslide in the area where the
respondent held a concession).
49Brazil: STF, Recurso Extraordinário n 737.977/SP, decision of 4 September 2014 (relying
on the ‘international law principle of precaution’ to require pre‐emptive mechanisms to
address actions that threaten the sustainable use of ecosystems); India: S Jagannath v Union
of India and ors 1997 (2) SCC 87 (requiring, among others, extensive public regulatory
action to remedy the environmental damage caused by intensive shrimp farming).
50The outcome of the major international conference was UNGA ‘The Future We Want’
UN Doc A/RES/66/288 (11 September 2012).
51UNFCCC ‘Decision 1/CP.21, Adoption of the Paris Agreement’ UN Doc FCCC/CP/2015/
10/Add.1 (29 January 2016).
52UNGA ‘Addis Ababa Action Agenda of the Third International Conference on Financing
for Development’ UN Doc A/RES/69/313 (27 July 2015) Annex.
53UNGA ‘Transforming our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development’ UN
Doc A/RES/70/1 (21 October 2015).
54Environment Commission of the Club des Juristes, ‘Increasing the Effectiveness of Inter-
national Environmental Law: Duties of States, Rights of Individuals’ (November 2015).
55See Y Aguila, ‘La Adopción de un Pacto Internacional para la Protección del Medio Ambi-
ente’ (2016) 34 Revista Aranzadi de Derecho Ambiental; Y Aguila, ‘L'Adozione di un Patto
Internazionale per la Protezione dell'Ambiente’ (2016) 3 Rivista Giuridica dell'Ambiente 563.
56See n 16.
57See ‘Projet de Pacte International Relatif au Droit des Êtres Humains l'Environnement du
CIDCE’ <https://cidce.org/fr>.
AGUILA AND VIÑUALES | 5
developed by the Centre International de Droit Comparé de l'Environ-
nement (CIDCE), a nongovernmental organization based in France.
To finalize the draft text, an expert meeting was convened in
Paris at the facilities of France's Conseil Constitutionnel on 23 June
2017. For logistical reasons, only some 30 experts participated in
this meeting, which under the chairmanship of Laurent Fabius pro-
ceeded to the discussion and adoption of the draft project. The fol-
lowing day, at a high‐profile symposium held at the Grand
Amphithéatre de la Sorbonne, the draft project was presented by Mr
Fabius to French President Emmanuel Macron, in a ceremony featur-
ing former UN Secretary‐General Ban Ki‐moon, former Governor of
California Arnold Schwarzenegger, the French Minister of the Envir-
onment Nicolas Hulot, the Mayor of Paris Anne Hidalgo, several
other political figures, and a wider public of experts, diplomats, stu-
dents and interested people.58
Between June 2017 and early November 2018, when the pres-
ent article was written, several major steps have been taken to
support the idea of a GPE, including many expert gatherings,59 a
high‐level event on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly meet-
ing on 19 September 2017 titled ‘Summit on a Global Pact for the
Environment’,60 a Sino‐French Summit between French President
Emmanuel Macron and Chinese President Xi Jinping on 8–10 Jan-
uary 2018,61 and the meeting of the UN General Assembly in which
the Enabling Resolution was adopted.
This meeting was held in early May 2018, under point 14 of the
Agenda of the UN General Assembly's plenary.62 The French delega-
tion introduced the Draft Resolution (A/72/L.51) to which the Ken-
yan delegation proposed minor amendments (A/72/L.53), essentially
aimed at ensuring that the process unfolds in Nairobi. Some other
delegations (the United States, the Russian Federation, the Philip-
pines and Syria) took the floor to oppose the project or aspects of
it. The arguments aired by these delegations included matters of
process (e.g. the fact that the project had not been sufficiently
discussed or that France had not engaged with the chairperson of
the Group of 77 plus China), the need for respect of the sovereignty
of States to exploit their natural resources, the need to focus on the
implementation of existing instruments rather than on using political
capital for an additional normative development, and matters of for-
mulation relating to the need to leave the outcome of the ad hoc
group open‐ended. Interestingly, a recorded vote was requested (in-
stead of the frequent practice of adoption without a vote), which
yielded a 143 majority, with only six votes against (the Philippines,
Russian Federation, Syria, Turkey, United States and Iran, although
the latter noted at the end that its vote had been inaccurately
recorded, because it supported adoption) and six abstentions
(Belarus, Malaysia, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia and Tajikistan).
This distribution of votes, and the identity of the current govern-
ments – not the countries – voting against the resolution, speaks for
itself. It is, however, important to recall it in an article that hopefully
will serve as a record for future generations to know where the
resistance came from.
The arguments, although not entirely unfounded, ring hollow.
The GPE has been in the making for decades and asking for more
time is possibly a euphemism for supporting inaction. The same
applies to arguments relating to improving implementation by means
of piecemeal – at best – corrections in existing agreements. Ad-
equate consultation of the chairperson of the Group of 77 plus
China would have certainly been useful, but developing countries
voted massively in favour of the resolution and the Chinese delega-
tion explicitly took the floor to support the French initiative. As for
references to sovereignty, there is no element in the proposal or in
the idea of a GPE that explicitly or implicitly encroaches upon sover-
eignty as understood in contemporary international law. Perhaps the
reaction was a resurgence from the past, as suggested by the Syrian
delegate who noted, quite surprisingly in the light of the existence
of hundreds of global environmental treaties, that ‘the concept of
world environmental law was still legally controversial’.63 In any case,
these and other concerns will have ample room for discussion in the
process envisioned in the Enabling Resolution.
In a nutshell, the resolution calls for the UN Secretary‐General to
prepare a ‘technical and evidence‐based report that identifies
and assesses possible gaps in international environmental law and
environment‐related instruments with a view to strengthening their
implementation’.64 This report, an advance version of which was pub-
lished in late November 2018,65 will be discussed by an ‘ad hoc open‐
ended working group’ with a view to ‘consider possible options to
address possible gaps in international environmental law and environ-
ment‐related instruments, as appropriate, and, if deemed necessary,
the scope, parameters and feasibility of an international instrument’.66
The working group is tasked with ‘making recommendations [to the
General Assembly], which may include the convening of an intergov-
ernmental conference to adopt an international instrument’.67 Ambi-
guity is pervasive in this and other formulations used in the Enabling
Resolution. What seems far more precise is the demanding time frame
for the ad hoc group to do so, namely during the first half of 2019.
The President of the UN General Assembly appointed two co‐chairs
for the working group, one from Portugal (Ambassador Francisco
António Duarte Lopes) and the other from Lebanon (Ambassador Amal
58See Y Aguila, ‘Vers un Pacte Mondial pour l'Environnement: Acte Fondateur à Paris le 24
juin 2017’ (2017) 25 La semaine juridique 718.
59See n 4.
60See Speech delivered by President Emmanuel Macron during the international launch
summit of the ‘Global Pact for the Environment’, which took place during the 72nd UN
General Assembly, available at <https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/
united-nations/events/united-nations-general-assembly-sessions/unga-s-72nd-session/artic
le/speech-by-m-emmanuel-macron-president-of-the-republic-summit-on-the-global-pact>.
61‘Joint Declaration between the People's Republic of China and the French Republic’ (10
January 2018) para 8 (‘China and France intend to continue their constructive dialogue on
the formulation of the Global Pact for the Environment’), translation available at <http://
www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-01/11/c_136886038.htm>.
62See ‘General Assembly Decides to Establish Working Group Aimed at Identifying Gaps in
International Environmental Law’ (UN Meeting coverage, GA 12015, 10 May 2018).
63Cited in ibid.
64Enabling Resolution (n 1) para 1.
65UN Secretary‐General, ‘Gaps in International Environmental Law and Environment‐related
Instruments: Towards a Global Pact for the Environment’ UN Doc A/73/419 (30 November
2018).
66Enabling Resolution (n 1) para 2.
67ibid.
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Mudallali). The group held its first meeting on 5–7 September 2018 to
address organizational matters. Three other meetings focusing on sub-
stance will be held in the first half of 2019 (the last session is sched-
uled to start on 20 May 2019), all in Nairobi, as had been the wish of
the Kenyan delegation. This is key to ensure the buy‐in from develop-
ing countries as well as from UNEP.
It is important to note, as will become apparent in the next sec-
tion, that the initiative for a GPE never expected for the draft pro-
ject to be adopted as such, or even in a mildly revised form. The
text proposed is above all representative of an approach, which may
change significantly, even fundamentally during the negotiations. The
key expectation is that negotiations will indeed start and that the ‘in-
strument’ envisioned by the negotiation mandate will constitute a
step further than the Rio Declaration.
5 | NATURE, CONTENT AND
INTERACTION WITH EXISTING
INSTRUMENTS
5.1 | A binding instrument
The initiative for a GPE specifically aims for the adoption of a binding
treaty providing an umbrella to a wider body of MEAs. Although the
Enabling Resolution leaves the question open, referring only to ‘pos-
sible options to address possible gaps… and, if deemed necessary, the
scope, parameters and feasibility of an international instrument’,68 the
explicit mention of the ‘convening of an intergovernmental conference
to adopt an international instrument’ makes abundantly clear that the
recommendations of the ad hoc working group may lead to the adop-
tion of a treaty. At the very least, that ‘possible option’ is certainly
within the cards. Some observers have suggested that a soft law
instrument could also be a possible option. That position is consistent
with the terms of the Enabling Resolution, but at odds with its spirit,
as highlighted in the very title of the resolution ‘Towards a Global Pact
for the Environment’.
The term ‘Pact’ unequivocally refers to a binding treaty. It was
selected, among several other terms falling under the genus treaty
(e.g. covenant, convention, agreement, treaty, protocol), both for its
similarity in at least three UN languages (Pact, Pacte, Pacto) and in
order to convey the generality of the instrument envisioned, which
is to be a ‘Pact’ adopted by States but emphasizing the role of a
much wider body of stakeholders. In addition, the term Pact con-
notes a general value stance taken by the international community,
much as in the context of the recently drafted Global Compacts on
Migration and Refugees.69
Since the early stages of the initiative, and throughout the
discussions within the network of experts, it was clearly understood
that the draft project was only intended as a basis for discussion
that would be subject to detailed scrutiny by all States and very
likely undergo substantial, even fundamental modifications. At the
same time, however, the draft project was intended to substantiate
the claim that over a hundred environmental law experts, including
academics but also practitioners, from all four corners of the world
considered the idea to be realistic and ripe for action. Thus, the draft
project is, in many ways, a ‘proof of concept’ developed to lend
credibility to the larger enterprise of launching negotiations to con-
clude a GPE. This clarification is important, because much of the criti-
cism that the initiative has faced, including from overtly hostile
quarters, either rely on the aforementioned euphemisms for inaction
or focus on details of formulation in the draft project which will very
likely change in the course of the negotiations, without undermining
the overall idea.
5.2 | Fundamental choices relating to content and
design
The contents of the draft project reflect a number of fundamental
choices arising from the consultation process. These choices con-
cern: (i) the conciseness of the instrument; (ii) a formulation empha-
sizing its enduring character; (iii) its adaptability to different country
contexts; (iv) a balance between rights and duties; (v) a balance
between well‐established principles and novel ones; and (vi) a bal-
ance between the normative and the institutional dimension.
The draft project is specifically drafted as a very concise docu-
ment, a few pages long, avoiding as much as possible unnecessary
complications. This is consistent not only with the end result sought
by the initiative for a GPE, that is, a binding statement of fundamen-
tal principles, but also with the nature of the draft project as such,
which is to provide an accessible basis for discussion that can be
scrutinized in great detail by States and other stakeholders, without
requiring inordinate amounts of time and effort.
The style used in the formulation of the project seeks to avoid
any excessive embeddedness in our present time or, more specific-
ally, it attempts to formulate principles of enduring relevance for the
present but also the future. This is a common feature of instruments
that are expected to deploy their effects through long periods of
time, such as constitutions, human rights treaties, constitutive instru-
ments of international organizations, and so on. However, unlike
many of these other treaties, the endurance of the draft project
does not rest on a heavy institutional architecture but on the general
formulation of its principles. This is because the scientific under-
standing of environmental problems, as well as of the suitability of
different answers, is constantly changing.
The generality of the formulation is also important for the
adaptability of the draft project to the very different circum-
stances prevailing across countries. It would be unfair to say that
the draft project assumes that ‘one size fits all’. This important
consideration was specifically taken into account by the expert
68ibid (emphases added).
69See the 13 July 2018 version of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migra-
tion in UNGA ‘Draft Outcome Document of the Conference’ UN Doc A/CONF.231/3 (30
July 2018), adopted at an intergovernmental conference December 2018; and the 26 June
2017 version of the Global Compact on Refugees <https://www.unhcr.org/events/confere
nces/5b3295167/official-version-final-draft-global-compact-refugees.html>, endorsed by
the UN General Assembly at the end of 2018.
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network and the drafting committee, which did their best to
ensure that the text is sufficiently general to be capable of provid-
ing normative guidance while at the same time allowing States to
tailor the implementation of the principles in the GPE to their
own circumstances.
Reflecting the wide recognition, at the domestic level,70 and the
increasingly pressing calls, at the international level,71 for a right to
an environment of a certain quality (often characterized with the
adjective ‘healthy’, ‘clean’, ‘safe’ or ‘generally satisfactory’), the draft
project formulates, in its Article 1, a ‘right to an ecologically sound
environment’.72 This statement is mirrored, in Article 2, by the
assertion of a correlative ‘duty to take care of the environment’.
Importantly, this duty is incumbent on ‘[e]very State or international
institution, every person, natural or legal, public or private’.73 This
is a very progressive stance, which has been criticized for exces-
sively expanding the spectrum of duty‐bearers and, thereby, pos-
sibly undermining the role of the State as the primary duty‐bearer
in connection with both human rights and environmental norms.
This is a relevant point, which States will need to examine in great
detail in their discussions concerning a future GPE. The current for-
mulation of Article 2 is designed to put on the table the full spec-
trum of possible duty‐bearers or, in other words, to highlight that
the duty to take care of the environment is not to be conceived of
only as a duty of States. The architecture of the draft project flows
from this combination of a right and a duty. In Articles 3–20, the
draft project states a series of rights (e.g. Articles 9–11, which
unravel Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration, but explicitly stating
that these are rights of ‘every person’) and duties (on a range of
duty‐bearers, including ‘States’ or the ‘Parties’, but also ‘their sub‐
national entities’,74 ‘present generations’75 or, by avoiding the iden-
tification of a specific duty‐bearer, any entity which is in a situation
covered by the duty76).
The principles featured in the draft project include well‐known
norms,77 in some cases using formulations that clarify previous
ambiguities or expand the principles’ scope.78 But the project also
innovates by including principles, which so far had not featured in
a general statement of principles79 or even in previous treaties.80
The expert group sought to strike a balance between the consolida-
tion and the innovation function of the project. Consolidation is
important to strengthen existing norms as well as to assuage
potential concerns of States reluctant to undertaking new commit-
ments. Yet, some measure of innovation is also important because
the project must be an additional step in the evolution of global
environmental governance and, as much as possible, an inspiring
and energizing one.
Finally, the draft project strikes a balance between its normative
dimension (the formulation of principles) and its institutional one (the
creation of a new body). Sensitive to the concerns expressed by sev-
eral members of the expert group, which more broadly reflect States’
concerns, the draft project provides for a very light institutional com-
ponent. Indeed, Article 21 contemplates the creation of a Committee
of independent experts, whose structure and mandate would be mid-
way between that of the committees set up by human rights instru-
ments and that of the compliance committees established by MEAs.
The non‐adversarial approach followed by Article 21 of the draft pro-
ject is derived from the latter source, specifically from Article 15 of
the Paris Agreement, which reflects similar provisions in earlier MEAs.
However, because the draft project does not provide for the creation
of a Conference of the Parties or of any other strong institutional
architecture, this committee would operate in a manner akin to that
of the Human Rights Committee established by the 1966 Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The articulation of these
two components, namely a statement of principles and a Committee
of independent experts with general and specific compliance as well
as interpretive functions, seeks to achieve a focus on implementation
without relying on a heavy institutional structure.
Figure 1 summarizes these six dimensions in graphic form. This
figure is offered as a tool for the discussion and design of a potential
GPE which may arise from the work of the ad hoc working group. A
70See D Boyd, The Environmental Rights Revolution (UBC Press 2012); JR May and E Daly,
Global Environmental Constitutionalism (Cambridge University Press 2015).
71See ‘UN Expert Calls for Global Recognition of the Right to Safe and Healthy Environ-
ment’ (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 5 March 2018) (in which former
Special Rapporteur John Knox states: ‘I hope the Human Rights Council agrees the right to
a healthy environment is an idea whose time is here. The Council should consider support-
ing the recognition of this right in a global instrument’); ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur
on the Issue of Human Rights Obligations Relating to the Enjoyment of a Safe, Clean,
Healthy and Sustainable Environment’ UN Doc A/73/188 (19 July 2018) para 37 (‘The time
has come for the United Nations to formally recognize the human right to a safe, clean,
healthy and sustainable environment, or, more simply, the human right to a healthy environ-
ment’); ‘Statement by David R. Boyd, Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and the Environ-
ment at the 73rd Session of the General Assembly’ (25 October 2018) (‘after six years as
mandate holder, Professor Knox came to the conclusion that there is a glaring gap in the
global human rights system. He and I are in 100% agreement that it is time for the UN to
recognize the fundamental human right to live in a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable envir-
onment’).
72See ‘Draft Global Pact for the Environment’ (24 June 2017) art 1; ‘White Paper: Toward a
Global Pact for the Environment’ (September 2017), both available at <www.pactenvironme
nt.org>.
73See ‘Introductory Report on the Draft Global Pact for the Environment’ (September 2018)
7.
74Draft Global Pact for the Environment (n 72) art 17.
75ibid art 4.
76ibid art 6 (‘Precaution’) or art 20 (‘Diversity of national circumstances’).
77See, e.g., the principle of integration, the principle of inter‐generational equity, the pre-
vention principle and the requirement to conduct an environmental impact assessment, pre-
caution, the polluter‐pays principle, the triad of access to environmental information,
participation in environmental decision‐making and access to justice or cooperation.
78See, e.g., Article 4 on the principle of intergenerational equity (compared with Principle 3
of the Rio Declaration, which only referred to intergenerational equity at the end as a con-
sideration in the exercise of the right to development). For the conceptual underpinnings of
this principle, see E Brown Weiss, ‘The Planetary Trust: Conservation and Intergenerational
Equity’ (1984) 11 Ecology Law Quarterly 495. Another example is Article 8 on the polluter‐
pays principle, which expands the remit of the principle not only as a national instrument
but also as a principle governing the relations among States, and it clarifies that the cost
shall be borne by the ‘originator’ of the damage (compare with Principle 6 of the Rio Declar-
ation). See generally P Schwartz, ‘The Polluter‐pays Principle’ in Viñuales, The Rio Declar-
ation (n 15) 429.
79See, e.g., Article 17 on the principle of ‘non‐regression’. On this principle, see generally M
Prieur and G Sozzo, La Non-régression en Droit de l'Environnement (Bruylant 2012).
80See, e.g., Article 14 on the ‘role of non‐State actors and sub‐national entities’ or Article
16 on the principle of ‘resilience’. On the realities underpinning the recognition of these
two concepts, see H Bulkeley et al, Transnational Climate Change Governance (Cambridge
University Press 2014) and N Robinson, ‘Evolved Norms: A Canon for the Anthropocene’ in
C Voigt (ed), A Rule of Law for Nature (Cambridge University Press 2013) 46.
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balance in all six dimensions, and perhaps in some others, will need
to be struck by the working group and, as the case may be, by the
intergovernmental conference. Commentators, whether from aca-
demic or policy circles, would also need to shed light on these
dimensions and, more specifically, on the advantages and disadvan-
tages of different combinations. The conceptual chart offered in Fig-
ure 1 will hopefully be of use to provide some structure to the
debates.
5.3 | Interaction with existing instruments
The Enabling Resolution, in its paragraph 9, ‘[r]ecognises that the
process indicated above [i.e. the ad hoc open‐ended working group
and its possible continuation by an intergovernmental conference]
should not undermine existing relevant legal instruments and frame-
works and relevant global, regional and sectoral bodies’.
It is important, in clarifying the scope of this paragraph, to dispel
one common misunderstanding. A GPE would neither exclude the
application of other instruments to the same situation nor be pre-
vented from applying when such other instruments apply. It is possi-
ble for existing instruments to be either more specific or more general
than the proposed GPE, or even both more specific and more general
at the same time (the analysis may have to be conducted provision by
provision or clause by clause). It is also possible that the proposed
GPE may cover areas left open by existing instruments (e.g. providing
a global fallback regime for matters as diverse as plastic pollution or,
more generally, land‐based pollution or atmospheric pollution, before
a more targeted instrument is adopted) or that it may contribute to
their interpretation in such a way that unlocks the potential of certain
provisions (e.g. to clarify the implications of some existing treaties for
consumption‐driven pollution). These and other forms of interaction
are possible and acceptable.
Out of all the possible forms of interaction between existing
instruments and the proposed one, only those whereby the latter
would ‘undermine’ the former are to be avoided. The term ‘undermine’
must be understood, in this context, as capable of defeating the envi-
ronmental protection purpose of existing treaties. As long as the pro-
posed GPE does not defeat the environmental protection purposes
pursued by these many instruments, the approach would be deemed
consistent with the parameters set in paragraph 9. It is difficult to con-
ceive how the proposed GPE could defeat those purposes. Those
who argue against the proposed GPE or a specific provision included
in it would have the burden to identify how exactly and to what
extent there is a genuine risk that the Pact may undermine an existing
instrument. Such arguments should be established in a manner that is
no less ‘technical and evidence‐based’ than the report envisaged in
the Enabling Resolution, which was published in late November 2018.
It should be noted that, from a technical standpoint, the Interna-
tional Court of Justice has expressly recognized that different norms
may all apply together to cover different aspects of a complex situ-
ation. Thus, the Court has referred to the need to take into account
the prevention of environmental harm in assessing the necessity and
proportionality of an armed action taken in self‐defence81 or, more
specifically, to the possibility that human rights norms and norms of
international humanitarian law (by analogy, also environmental
norms) may apply together.82 For present purposes, the relevance of
F IGURE 1 Dimensions of the Global Pact for the Environment
81Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) [1996] ICJ Rep 226
para 30.
82ibid para 25; Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory (Advisory Opinion) [2004] ICJ Rep 136 para 106.
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this point is to recall that different norms are not necessarily mutu-
ally exclusive. The principles formulated in a general statement such
as the proposed GPE could: (i) apply together with other more speci-
fic norms and treaties; (ii) without either excluding their application
or being excluded by it; and (iii) making a useful contribution to the
regime governing a range of different situations, either by addressing
aspects left open by existing treaties or by contributing to the inter-
pretation of the latter.
6 | PROSPECTS
It is for States to decide whether the adoption of a GPE, of a na-
ture, scope and content to be discussed, is indeed an idea whose
time has come. It is of course very likely that, 50 years from now,
arguments against the GPE will look like arguments against the
1966 International Human Rights Covenants, or even the 1948
Universal Declaration on Human Rights or the 1948 Genocide Con-
vention, that is, as either politically motivated or, at best, as retro-
grade.
The proposed GPE is not an unrealistic idea. It is, in our view, a
logical next step in the evolution of global environmental govern-
ance. The adoption of an overarching statement of principles is con-
sistent with the practice in many other areas of international law.
One could refer in this regard not only to human rights but also to
the law of the sea,83 trade law,84 international criminal law85 or
international humanitarian law.86 The situation is similar at the
domestic level. Countries from all corners of the world have adopted
general environmental statutes87 which, despite their diverging
scope, have a transversal application to environmental protection
and seek to provide some unity and coherence of principle to
sectoral statutes. In many cases, these general statutes came after
sectoral ones,88 precisely to provide some measure of consolidation
and coherence. We do not see why similar considerations would not
be relevant for international environmental law.
There is, however, much room for arguing about the nature,
scope and content of an overarching instrument and, in offering a
framework (Figure 1) to structure the diversity of arguments as well
as in fleshing out how a balance between different considerations
was struck in the draft project, this article hopes to contribute to
such discussions and provide a written record for future generations
of how this generation sought to address the problems – largely of
its own making – that they will face much more acutely.
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